Murad Ismael, head of the Ezidi Cause Bloc in the Iraqi parliament, has welcomed the government’s announcement that YBŞ fighters will begin handing over their weapons to the state and that eligible members will be integrated into official Iraqi security institutions. In a statement following a meeting with the prime minister and the YBŞ leadership, Ismael called the arrangement a “first step on the right path,” presenting it as a way to protect Ezidi rights while ending the existence of competing security authorities in Şengal.
On its face, this is not a departure from Ismael’s previous position. He has repeatedly argued that local Ezidi forces should receive formal recognition within official state structures rather than be moved between informal security arrangements. Earlier this year, he proposed integrating the YBŞ and other local Ezidi forces through the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Interior, or another official institution reporting directly to the prime minister. He has also insisted that the future of Şengal cannot be decided without the participation of its people, rejecting the idea of a military administration imposed from above.
That distinction is central. Opposing a military administrator or an externally designed security settlement is not the same as opposing a negotiated integration of local defenders. The newly announced arrangement could meet Ismael’s earlier conditions if the YBŞ leadership and the affected Ezidi community have genuinely agreed to it, and if members receive legal status, protection and a clearly defined role in securing their own homeland.
Yet the public announcement leaves the most important questions unanswered. The government says that “eligible” YBŞ members will be integrated, but it has not set out who is eligible, how many fighters are covered, where they will serve, what command structure will apply, or what will happen to women’s units and Ezidi civil protection structures. It is equally unclear how this security measure will relate to civilian administration, political representation, reconstruction and the return of displaced Ezidis.
That is where the story begins. The issue is not simply whether weapons should fall under a lawful authority. It is whether this integration will preserve a meaningful local Ezidi security role and come with the representation, civilian administration and safeguards needed to prevent another decision about Şengal from being made over the heads of its people. Until the terms are released and those directly affected confirm them, the announcement should be treated as a commitment still to be tested—not as the final resolution of Şengal’s long-running security crisis.
