Key observations from the Ezidi Genocide Trial in Sweden

Published by Ezidi Times on

© Ezidi Times; Stockholm District Court.

October 11, 2024

On October 10, 2024, it was hearing day 2 of 31 in the case between the prosecutor and Lina Ishaq at the Stockholm District Court in Sweden. Day two was dedicated to establishing who the Ezidis are, whether they constitute a protected ethnic group under the Genocide Convention, and finally, whether the events that began in August 2014 constitute genocide. Thus, the focus of the day was primarily on the Ezidis and the concept of genocide, with the defendant and her actions receiving little attention.

The prosecutor dedicated a significant amount of time to the Ezidis, as it is important for the court to establish that they constitute a group protected under the Genocide Convention. It is worth noting that the prosecutor has chosen to classify the crimes committed against the Ezidis as genocide motivated by their religious affiliation rather than their ethnicity. According to the prosecutor, ISIS terrorists aimed to eradicate the Ezidi religion and forced individuals to convert to islam. The prosecutor has taken the perpetrators’ intent as the viewpoint point and therefore argued that the Ezidis were subjected to genocide due to their religious affiliation.

Although the prosecutor’s reasoning is understandable and legally correct, it is important to highlight some aspects to prevent misinterpretation and misrepresentation in the future. Although the perpetrators viewed the Ezidi religion (Sharfadin) as the reason for their extermination, it should not be interpreted as meaning that the Ezidis are merely a religious group. Similar to Jews, the Ezidi identity is multidimensional, where religion and ethnicity are two equally important aspects of that identity. Many find it difficult to understand how a group’s identity can be so strongly based on ethnoreligious affiliation. For a better understanding of this, we recommend reading the work of Artur Rodziewicz as the author explains the complex yet self-evident nature of Ezidi identity to the Western world:

Rodziewicz, A. (2018).
Milete min Êzîd. The Uniqueness of the Yezidi Concept of the Nation. Securitologia, 2018 (1). Available here.

Regarding the Ezidi language, the prosecutor chose to rely on UNITAD’s and other organizations’ assessments, stating that the Ezidis speak a dialect of Kurdish. This is unfortunate, as many linguists do not even classify Kurdish as a single language, but rather as a collection of different languages spoken by people who identify as Kurds. The Ezidi language has always been referred to as Ezdiki. Ezdiki is as similar to Kurmanji as Hindi is to Urdu. No educated person today would consider Hindus (or citizens of India) to be Pakistanis simply because their languages are similar. The relationship between the Ezidis and Kurds is analogous to that between the populations of India and Pakistan. While this issue may not be the most critical and is better suited for linguistic discussion, it is important not to accept the positions taken by certain organizations uncritically.

During the proceedings, the prosecutor presented videos from UNITAD. These included interviews with Ezidi victims, but there were often discrepancies between what the individuals in the videos said and the subtitles displayed. In many cases, Kurdish interpreters were used, which puts Ezidis at a disadvantage since their voices are mediated by yet another perpetrator. Currently, there is a lack of Ezidi interpreters in both Sweden and the West, and it is a fact that most interpreters used for Ezidis today are Kurds. Although this may seem like an overemphasized aspect, it is important not to overlook the fact that Kurds in the Middle East (and increasingly on social media) engage in aggressive propaganda that silences Ezidi protests when they refuse to be part of a Kurdish identity and rightfully claim their unique Ezidi identity.

The risk of not acknowledging this fact is that some may try to exploit the suffering that Ezidis have endured. Certain actors in the Middle East, particularly those who refuse to accept the unique Ezidi ethnic and religious identity, including Kurdish extremists, prefer to classify Ezidis as a religion in order to claim that they are subgroup of the Kurds. In other words, they attempt to present themselves as victims in the name of the Ezidis. However, we must not forget that the same Kurdish troops that “opened a corridor for the Ezidis starving in the Sinjar mountains in northern Iraq” was also responsible for disarming the Yazidis and enabling IS to attack Ezidi towns and villages in the Sinjar region from the outset. It was, after all, the same Kurdish troops who received orders from higher ups to abandon their positions so that IS could easily take over the entire Ezidi-populated region.

Read

The shocking Kurdish role in Iraq’s Yezidi genocide on the Cradle (here)

and

Can The Peshmerga Fighters Be Held Liable For Abandoning The Yazidis In Sinjar? On Forbes here.

These observations should not be seen as an attack on the prosecutor, the police, or the other professionals working with Ezidis and the genocide. Many of these individuals may be unaware of the underlying reasons for the starkly differing views on Ezidi identity and belonging. At the same time, it should be noted that the prosecutor also acknowledged the discrepancies regarding how Ezidis should be referred to. Hopefully, this is something that the court (two legal judges and three lay judges) will recognize and emphasize in the final ruling when it comes.

It is therefore crucial for judges, prosecutors, lawyers, authorities, and politicians in the West to be aware of the consequences their terminology regarding Ezidis may have. For the Ezidis, it is not only important for the world to recognize the genocide and for survivors to receive justice and support; it is also vital that the West does not forcibly categorize Ezidis with Kurds, thereby perpetuating the same oppression they fled from in the Middle East.

Finally, we at Ezidi Times hope that all Ezidis reading this article understand the necessity of actively advocating for our rights and making our voices heard. Currently, many national institutions and international organizations struggle to find professional actors who are Ezidis. It is therefore not surprising that others (non-Ezidis) interpret and categorize Ezidis in ways that suit their interests.

The trial against Lina Ishaq will continue until December 2024 and the verdict will probably be handed down in the beginning of 2025.